MACROECONOMICS. Matthias Doepke. University of Chicago. Andreas Lehnert. Board of Governors of the. Federal. Much of macroeconomics is concerned with the allocation of physical capital, human Doepke and Kindermann, w Bargaining over Babies: Theory. Macroeconomics by Matthias Doepke, Andreas Lehnert, Andrew Sellgren – free book at E-Books Directory. You can download the book or read it online.
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Northwestern University Department of Economics. Trends in Work and Leisure: Colonieswith Andrea Eisfeldt January Book Love, Money, and Parenting: Clans, Guilds, and Markets: Quarterly Journal of EconomicsFebruary Money as a Unit of Accountwith Martin Schneider.
EconometricaSeptember Review of Economic StudiesJuly Exploitation, Altruism, and Social Welfare: Annual Review of EconomicsJuly Journal of Economic GrowthMarch What’s in It for Men? Quarterly Journal of EconomicsNovember Amcroeconomics Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracywith David de la Croix. Review of Economic StudiesApril Quarterly Journal of EconomicsMay Journal of Political EconomyDecember Aggregate Implications of Wealth Redistribution: The Case of Inflationwith Martin Schneider.
Journal of Economic TheoryJanuary American Economic ReviewDecember Child Mortality and Fertility Decline: Journal of Coepke EconomicsJune Show Me the Money: Journal of Economic GrowthSeptember Journal of Development EconomicsApril American Economic ReviewSeptember Chapter 23 in Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. Culture, Entrepreneurship, and Growthwith Fabrizio Zilibotti. Chapter 1 in Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol.
Matthias Doepke | IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
Origins and Consequences of Child Labor Restrictions: Women’s Empowerment and Development: Tiger Moms and Helicopter Parents: Is International Activism the Solution or the Problem? It takes a woman and a man to make a baby.
This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents macroeconimics first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries macroconomics are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child.
We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in macroecknomics the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers. Fertility, Bargaining, Doepkf Care. The paper November A non-technical summary in Czech: A non-technical summary in German: Interview with HCEO that includes a discussion of the paper: Other discussions of the paper: Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers as opposed to fathers increases expenditures on children.
Does this imply that targeting transfers to women promotes economic development? We consider a noncooperative model of the household where a gender wage gap leads to endogenous household specialization.
As a result, women indeed spend more on children and invest more in human capital. Yet, depending on the nature of the production function, targeting transfers to women may be beneficial or harmful to growth. Transfers to women are more likely to be beneficial when human capital, rather than physical capital or land, is the most important factor of production.
We provide empirical evidence supportive of our mechanism: Gender Equality, Development, Marital Bargaining. The paper August Since the s, the United States has experienced a sharp rise in the college wage premium.
In contrast, in a number of European economies such as Germany and Italy the return to education stayed roughly the same. In this paper, we argue that differences in employment protection can account for a substantial part of these diverging trends. In our model, firms and workers can invest in relationship-specific capital: The incentives to undertake such investments are stronger when employment protection creates an common expectation of long-lasting firm-worker matches.
Firms and workers also invest in relationship-specific capital in a calm economic environment where match-specific shocks are small. The diverging inequality patterns between the United States and Europe emerge from different levels of employment protection combined with an increase in “turbulence” Ljungqvist and Sargent in the economy starting in the s.
In recent decades, the correlation between U. This changing correlation accounts for roughly 30 percent of the rise in the variance of male earnings between and In this paper, we rationalize these trends in a model of joint household labor supply.
Our model is consistent with the observations that the changing wage-hours correlation among men is driven by married men, and that there is little change in the wage-hours correlation among employed women and at the household level.
Macroeconomics by Matthias Doepke, Andreas Lehnert, Andrew Sellgren
The results suggest that taking into account joint household decision making is essential for understanding the dynamics of labor supply. This paper quantitatively assesses distributional effects of monetary policy. We use a life cycle model with housing to compute the response of the U. We find than an increase in nominal interest rates generated by higher expected inflation has sizeable and heterogeneous welfare effects. Moreover, the responses of winners and losers do not cancel out; instead the policy announcement has persistent effects on aggregate consumption and house prices that propagate through the distribution of wealth.
Inflation, Redistribution, Monetary Policy, Housing. Mentions and discussions of the paper at other places: The paper partly supersedes an earlier paper entitled “Inflation as a Redistribution Shock: In many developing countries, the institutional framework governing economic life has its roots in the colonial period, when the interests of European settlers clashed with those of the native population or imported slaves.
We examine the economic implications of this conflict in a framework where institutions are represented by the number of people with property-rights protection, i. The theory generates a “reversal of fortune” between colonies with many and few oppressed: Colonization, Property Rights, Slavery, Development.
The paper January We document evidence on preferences for childbearing in developing countries.
Across countries, men usually desire larger families than women do. Within countries, we find wide dispersion in spouses’ desired fertility: This disagreement between spouses suggests that the extent to which women are empowered should matter for fertility choices. We point to evidence at both the macro and micro levels that this is indeed the case.
Women’s Empowerment, desired fertility, marital bargaining. In the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution, Western Europe gradually pulled ahead of other world regions in terms of technological creativity, population growth, and income per capita. We argue that superior institutions for the creation and dissemination of productive knowledge help explain the European advantage. We build a model of technological progress in a pre-industrial economy that emphasizes the person-to-person transmission of tacit knowledge.
The young learn as apprentices from the old. Institutions such as the family, the clan, the guild, and the market organize who learns from whom. We argue that medieval European institutions such as guilds, and specific features such as journeymanship, can explain the rise of Europe relative to regions that relied on the transmission of knowledge within closed kinship systems extended families or clans.
Apprenticeship, Guilds, Dissemination of Knowledge. Apprenticeship and the Rise of Europe Published in Vox. Discussions of this paper: YouTube Video in German of interview discussion of this paper. We develop a theory that rationalizes the use of a dominant unit of account in an economy. Agents enter into non-contingent contracts with a variety of business partners.